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1 Introduction
The Internet has been successful beyond even the most optimistic expectations. It permeates and
intertwines with almost all aspects of our society and economy. The success of the Internet has
created a dependency on communication as many of the processes underpinning the foundations
of modern society would grind to a halt should communication become unavailable. However,
much to our dismay, the current state of safety and availability of the Internet is far from being
commensurate given its importance.
Although we cannot conclusively determine what the impact of a 1-minute, 1-hour, 1-day, or 1-
week outage of Internet connectivity on our society would be, anecdotal evidence indicates that even
short outages have a profound negative impact on governmental, economic, and societal operations.
To make matters worse, the Internet has not been primarily designed for high availability in the face
of malicious actions by adversaries. Recent patches to improve Internet security and availability
have been constrained by the current Internet architecture, business models, and legal aspects.
Moreover, some of the fundamental design decisions of the current Internet inherently complicate
secure operation.
To address these issues, we study the design of a next-generation Internet architecture that
provides a fundamental building block: highly available point-to-point communication. In addition
to availability, the architecture should offer security by design, it should provide incentives for
deployment, and it should consider economic and political issues at the design stage.
As a solution to address these desired properties, we propose the inter-domain network archi-
tecture SCION, which is also an acronym for Scalability, Control, and Isolation on Next-Generation
Networks. In this article, we present (a retrospective of) its goals and design decisions, its attacker
model and limitations, and 5 years of research conducted since the initial publication [62].
2 Goals
In this section, we present high-level goals an inter-domain point-to-point communication archi-
tecture should satisfy; we illustrate why these goals are important and how they can be achieved.
Finally, we briefly discuss non-goals, i.e., specific properties that we intentionally excluded from
the design goals.
2.1 Availability in the Presence of Adversaries
Our overarching goal is the design of a point-to-point communication infrastructure that remains
highly available even in the presence of distributed adversaries: as long as an attacker-free path
between endpoints exists, that path should be discovered and used with guaranteed bandwidth
between these endpoints.
Availability in the presence of adversaries is an exceedingly challenging property to achieve. An
on-path adversary may drop, delay, or alter packets that it should forward, or inject packets into
the network. The architecture hence needs to provide mechanisms to circumvent these malicious
elements. An off-path adversary could launch hijack attacks to attract traffic to flow through
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network elements under its control. Such traffic attraction can take various forms; for instance,
an adversary could announce a desirable path to a destination (e.g., by using forged paths or
attractive network metrics). Conversely, the adversary could render paths not traversing its network
less desirable (e.g., by inducing congestion). An adversary controlling a large botnet could also
perform Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, congesting selected network links. Finally,
an adversary could interfere with the discovery of legitimate paths (e.g, by flooding path discovery
with bogus paths).
2.2 Transparency and Control
We aim to provide greater transparency and control for (1) forwarding paths of network packets,
and (2) trust roots that are used for entity validation.
Transparency and Control over Forwarding Paths. When the network offers path trans-
parency, endpoints know (and can verify) the forwarding path taken by network packets. Appli-
cations that transmit sensitive data can benefit from this property, as packets can be ensured to
traverse certain Internet service providers (ISPs) and avoid others.
Taking transparency of network paths as a first property, we aim to additionally achieve path
control, a stronger, more influential property, with which receivers can control incoming paths
through which they are reachable. Given a path to a receiver, senders can control end-to-end
paths. This seemingly benign requirement has various repercussions – beneficial but also fragile if
implemented incorrectly. The beneficial aspects of path control for senders and receivers include:
– Separation of network control plane and data plane. To enable path control, the control plane
(which determines networking paths) needs to be separated from the data plane (which for-
wards packets according to the determined paths). The separation ensures that forwarding
cannot retroactively be influenced by control-plane operations, e.g., routing changes. More-
over, the separation contributes to enhanced availability as working forwarding paths cannot
be disrupted by routing changes, but it also requires mechanisms to deal with link failures.
– Enabling of multi-path communication. Path control empowers multi-path communication by
letting senders select multiple paths to carry packets towards their destinations. Multi-path
communication is a powerful mechanism to enhance availability [4].
– Defending against network attacks. If the packet’s path is carried in its header (which is one way
to achieve path control), then the destination can reverse the packet path to return its response
to the sender, mitigating amplification attacks. Path control also enables circumvention of
malicious network entities or congested network areas, providing a powerful mechanism against
DoS and DDoS attacks.
The fragile aspects that need to be handled with particular care are the following.
– Respecting ISPs’ forwarding policies. If senders have complete path control, they may violate
ISPs’ forwarding policies. We thus need to ensure that ISPs offer a set of policy-compliant
paths amongst which senders can choose from.
– Preventing malicious path creation. A malicious sender could exploit path control for attacks,
for example by forming malicious forwarding paths such as loops that consume increased net-
work resources.
– Scalability of path control. Source routing does not scale to inter-domain networks, as a source
would need to know the network topology to determine paths. To make path control scale,
we ensure that sources select amongst a relatively small set of paths. We thus rely on source-
selected paths instead of full-fledged source routing.
– Permitting traffic engineering. Fine-grained path control would inhibit ISPs from operating
and performing traffic engineering. We thus seek to provide autonomous system (AS) level
path control only at the level of ingress/egress interfaces, allowing ISPs to still control paths
internally.
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Transparency and Control over Trust Roots. Roots of trust are used for the verification of
entities in today’s Internet. For example, verification of the server’s public key in a TLS certificate,
or verification of a Domain Name Service (DNS) response in DNSSEC [6]. Transparency of trust
roots provides the property that an end host or user can know the complete set of trust roots that
it needs to rely upon for the validation of an entity certificate. Such enumeration of trust roots is
complicated today because of intermediate Certification Authority (CA) certificates that are not
explicitly listed but implicitly trusted, e.g., in the TLS public key infrastructure (PKI). In fact,
independent studies have counted over 300 roots of trust in the TLS PKI [17,1], but because of
the lack of transparency there may be additional ones these studies have missed.
Providing control for trust root selection enables trust agility [39], allowing users to easily select
or exclude the roots of trust they want to rely upon. The challenge then becomes the validation
of each certificate, regardless of the choice of trust roots by users and network entities (e.g., web
servers).
2.3 Efficiency, Scalability, and Extensibility
Despite the lack of availability and transparency, today’s Internet also suffers from a number of
efficiency and scalability deficiencies: for instance, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), a global
inter-domain routing protocol, encounters scaling issues in cases of network fluctuations, where
routing protocol convergence can require minutes [51]. A 2006 earthquake in Taiwan that sev-
ered several undersea communication cables caused Internet outages throughout Asia for several
days [9]. Moreover, routing tables have reached the limits of their scalability due to prefix de-
aggregation (i.e., announcement of more specific prefixes) and multihoming [29]. Unfortunately,
extending the memory size of routing tables is challenging as the underlying Ternary Content-
Addressable Memory (TCAM) hardware is expensive and power-hungry, consuming on the order
of a third of the total power consumption of a router. Extending the routing table memory would
thus drastically increase cost and power consumption of routers.
Security and high availability come at a cost, usually resulting in lower efficiency and potentially
diminished scalability. High performance and scalability, however, are required for viability in
the current economic environment. We therefore explicitly seek high efficiency as a goal in the
common case such that packet forwarding latency and throughput are at least as fast as current IP
forwarding. Moreover, we seek improved scalability compared to the current Internet, in particular
with respect to BGP and the size of routing tables.
An approach to achieve efficiency and scalability is to avoid router state wherever possible. We
observe that modern block ciphers such as AES can be computed faster than performing memory
lookups. For example, on current PC platforms, computing AES requires on the order of 50 cycles
while fetching a byte from main memory requires around 200 cycles [2]. Moreover, modern block
ciphers can be implemented in hardware with tens of thousands of gates, which is sufficiently small
to replicate it profusely, which in turn enables high parallelism – the high complexity of a high-
speed memory system prevents such replication at the same scale. We thus aim to place state into
packet headers and protect the state cryptographically, enabling higher packet processing speeds
and simpler router architectures compared to today’s IP routers. Besides higher efficiency, avoiding
state on routers also prevents state-exhaustion attacks [53] and state inconsistencies.
Our goal of efficiency and scalability is in line with the end-to-end principle, which states that a
function should be implemented at the network layer in which it can most effectively operate [52].
Since the end host has the most information about its internal state, functions such as bit error
recovery, duplicate suppression, or delivery acknowledgments are best handled by the end host.
Compared to the current Internet, SCION applies the end-to-end principle one layer lower in the
protocol stack. Currently, most transport-layer functionality is handled by the end host according
to this principle. However, in SCION, end hosts also assist with network-layer functionality such
as path selection. End host path selection is communicated to the network by packet-carried
forwarding information, which in turn removes the need for inter-domain routing tables at border
routers. Consequently, end host path selection results in a simpler forwarding plane and thus more
efficient routers.
3
To future-proof SCION, we design the core architecture and code base to be extensible, such
that additional functionality can be easily built and deployed. SCION clients and routers should
(without overhead or expensive protocol negotiations) discover the minimum common feature set
supported by all intermediate nodes.
2.4 Support for Global but Heterogeneous Trust
Given the diverse nature of constituents in today’s Internet with diverse legal jurisdictions and
interests, an important challenge is how to scale authentication of entities (e.g., AS ownership for
routing, name servers for DNS, or domains for TLS) to a global environment. The roots of trust
of currently prevalent PKI models (monopoly and oligarchy) do not scale to a global environ-
ment because mutually distrusting entities cannot agree on a single trust root (monopoly model),
and because the security of a plethora of roots of trust is only as strong as its weakest link (oli-
garchy model). We thus seek a trust architecture that supports meaningful trust roots in a global
environment with mutually distrusting entities.
2.5 Deployability
Incentives for deployment are important to overcome the resistance for upgrading today’s Internet.
A multitude of features is necessary to offer the initial impulse: high availability even under control-
plane and data-plane attacks (e.g., built-in DDoS defenses), path transparency and control, trust
root transparency and control, high efficiency, robustness to configuration errors, fast recovery from
failures, high forwarding efficiency, multi-path forwarding, etc.
If early adopters cannot obtain sufficient benefits from migrating to a new network architecture,
even initial deployment is unlikely to be successful. Ideally, even the first deploying ISP can gain
a competitive advantage, and start selling services to its initial customers.
Migration to the new architecture should require minimal added complexity to the existing
infrastructure. Deployment should be possible by re-utilizing the internal switching infrastructure
of an ISP, and only require installation or upgrade of a few border routers. Moreover, configuration
of the new architecture should be similar to the existing architecture, such as in the configuration
of BGP policies, minimizing the amount of additional personnel training.
Economic and business incentives are also of critical importance. ISPs should be able to define
new business models and sell new services. Users should derive a business advantage from the
new architecture, for example, obtain properties similar to a leased line at a fraction of the cost.
Migration cost should be minimal, requiring only the deployment of low-cost routers. Finally, a
new architecture should not disrupt current Internet business models, but maintain the current
Internet topology and business relationships (e.g., support peering).
2.6 Non-Goals
We deliberately exclude certain properties and goals that could be added as additional functionality
later on. For example, we do not consider multicast or efficient content dissemination as part of the
basic communication infrastructure, as we recognize the significant complexity these features would
add. Also, these features can be effectively added through an overlay leveraging a next-generation
Internet architecture’s basic communication infrastructure [19].
We additionally consider several other problems out of scope for a network architecture. A
major category of current security problems are software vulnerabilities. While software vulnera-
bilities of end hosts are clearly out of scope, software vulnerabilities of network components such as
routers can affect network operation. It is thus important to address these network vulnerabilities
through robustness to malicious components and attempts to reduce them through a simple net-
work architecture. Malicious Internet content (e.g., spam or phishing emails, malicious web pages)
should not be directly addressed by the communication infrastructure. The architecture, however,
should offer mechanisms that assist in defending against theses threats.
4
ISD
core
TRC
ISD
core
ISD
AS
Prov.-Cust. link
Peering link
ISD
core
A
B
ISD
TRC
D E
C
ISD
ISD
core
TRC
H
I
ISD
TRC
Core link
G
F
Figure 1: Four SCION ISDs with ISD Cores and ASes. The ISD Core ASes are connected via Core
paths. Non-Core ASes are connected via customer-to-provider or peering links. AS H is contained
in two ISDs.
3 SCION Architecture Overview
We now provide a high-level overview of the SCION architecture. A more detailed description is in
papers available on our web site http://www.scion-architecture.net.
3.1 SCION High-Level Overview
A fundamental building block to achieve the properties of high availability, transparency, scala-
bility, and support for heterogeneous trust is ISolation Domains (ISDs). An ISD constitutes
a logical grouping of a set of Autonomous System (ASes), as depicted in Figure 1. An ISD
is administered by one or multiple ASes, which form the ISD Core. We refer to these ASes as
ISD Core ASes or simply Core ASes. An ISD contains one or multiple regular ASes. The ISD is
governed by a policy, called Trust Root Configuration (TRC), which is negotiated by the ISD
Core. The TRC defines the roots of trust that are used to validate bindings between named entities
and their public keys (key certificates) or their addresses (DNS). As part of the TRC, every ISD
has an associated human-understandable name space, which is globally unique. The only global
coordination that is required in SCION is hence the ISD name and number.
ASes join an ISD by purchasing service from another AS in the ISD; joining an ISD thus
constitutes an acceptance of the ISD’s TRC file. Otherwise, they would select an ISP which is
part of an ISD they desire to belong to. Typically, 3–10 current Tier-1 ISPs would constitute the
ISD’s Core ASes, and their associated customers would participate in the ISD. We envision that
ISDs will span areas with uniform legal environments that provide enforceable contracts. If two
ISPs have a contract dispute they cannot resolve by themselves, such a legal environment can
provide an external authority to resolve the dispute. All ASes within an ISD also agree on the
TRC, i.e., the entities that operate the trust roots and set the ISD policies. ISDs will thus likely be
formed along national boundaries or federations of nations, as entities within a legal jurisdiction
can enforce contracts and agree on a TRC. ISDs are hierarchical, as SCION supports sub-ISDs.
ISDs can also overlap in the sense that an AS may be part of several ISDs. Although an ISD does
provide isolation from other networks, the central purpose of an ISD is to provide transparency and
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Figure 2: (a) SCION ISD with path construction beacons (PCBs) that are propagated from the
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(b) Magnified view of an AS with its routers and servers. The path from AS C to the ISD Core
traverses two internal routers.
to support heterogeneous trust environments. Although ISDs may seem to lead to “Balkanization”
and prevent an open Internet, they counter-intuitively provide openness and transparency, as we
hope to elucidate in this article.
SCION uses two levels of routing, intra-ISD and inter-ISD. Both levels utilize Path Construc-
tion Beacons (PCBs) to discover and establish routing paths (see Figure 2a). An ISD Core AS
announces a PCB and disseminates it as a policy-constrained multi-path flood either within an
ISD (to discover intra-ISD paths) or amongst ISD Core ASes (to discover inter-ISD paths). PCBs
accumulate cryptographically protected AS-level path information as they traverse the network.
These cryptographically protected contents (that we call opaque fields as described below) within
received PCBs are chained together by sources to create a data transmission path segment that
traverses a sequence of ASes. Packets thus contain AS-level path information avoiding the need
for border routers to maintain inter-domain routing tables. We refer to this concept as Packet-
Carried Forwarding State (PCFS).
Through the inter-domain PCB transmission process, Core ASes learn paths to every other
Core AS. Through the intra-domain PCB dissemination, ASes learn path segments on how to
reach ISD Core ASes, which enable an AS to communicate with the ISD Core. Figure 2a shows
some path segments from the ASes A, B, C, and D to the ISD core.
We emphasize that PCFS in SCION is different from source routing, as a source node does
not search a network topology graph to select its path. Instead, with the approach of source-
selected paths, a source node combines at most three path segments (up-segment, core-segment,
and down-segment). Since an arbitrary source up-segment combined with an arbitrary destination
down-segment (along with an appropriate core-segment if necessary) results in a valid end-to-end
path, a source node does not need to search any topology to find a path, thus, the approach is
fundamentally different from source routing.
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3.2 Control Plane: Beaconing for Route Discovery
We now discuss the control plane components and mechanisms in more detail. The control plane
is responsible for discovering paths and making those paths available to end hosts. Figure 2b
shows the main components that perform these operations in SCION: beacon servers discover path
information; path servers disseminate such path information; and certificate servers assist with
validating received information. Border routers provide the connectivity between ASes.
Beacon servers are responsible for the dissemination of PCBs (see Figure 2a). Beacon servers
in a Core AS generate intra-ISD PCBs that are sent to all non-Core ASes of the ISD. Non-Core
AS beacon servers receive such PCBs and re-send them to their customer ASes, which results in
policy-compliant AS-level paths. Figure 3 shows PCBs that are propagated from the ISD Core
down to customer ASes. At every AS, information about the interfaces of the AS is added to the
PCB.
The beacon servers run a fault-tolerant protocol to ensure state consistency across all local
servers. Periodically, a master beacon server generates a set of PCBs that it forwards to its customer
ASes. In the case of inter-ISD communication, the beaconing process is similar to BGP’s route
advertising process, although the process is periodic and PCBs are flooded multi-path over policy-
compliant paths to discover multiple paths between any pair of ASes. SCION’s beacon servers can
be configured to express all BGP policies, as well as additional properties (e.g., control of upstream
ASes) that BGP cannot express.
Path servers store mappings from AS identifiers to sets of such announced path segments, and
are organized as a hierarchical caching system similar to today’s DNS. ASes, through the master
beacon servers, select the set of path segments through which they want to be reached, and upload
them to a path server in the ISD Core.
Certificate servers keep cached copies of TRC files retrieved from the ISD Core, keep cached
copies of other ASes certificates, and manage keys and certificates for securing intra-AS communi-
cation. Certificate servers are queried by beacon servers when validating the authenticity of PCBs
(i.e., when a beacon server does not have a corresponding certificate).
An AS typically receives several PCBs representing several diverse path segments on how to
reach various ISD Core ASes. Figure 2a shows two path segments for AS D. We call a path segment
that leads towards an ISD Core an up-segment, and a path segment that leads from the ISD
Core to an AS a down-segment – although path segments are typically bi-directional and thus
support packet forwarding in both directions. More precisely, up-segments and down-segments are
invertible: by flipping the order, an up-segment is converted to a down-segment and vice versa.
Path servers learn up-segments by extracting them from PCBs they obtain from the local beacon
servers. To reach its ISD Core, a host performs a path lookup at its local path server, fetching
up-segments to the ISD Core. To reach a remote destination, a host additionally queries its path
server for the down-segment of the destination AS. In case the local path server has no cached
entry for the down-segment, it will query the destination AS’s Core path server.
How do the Core path servers know the down-segments of the destination? The beacon servers
in an AS select the down-segments through which the AS desires to be reached, and register these
path segments at the Core path servers. When links fail, segments expire, or better segments
become available, the beacon servers keep updating the down-segments registered for their AS.
End-to-end communication is enabled by a combination of up to three path segments that form
a SCION end-to-end path. More precisely, the source host in ISD I sends a path resolution request
to its local path server, who forwards the request to a core path server. In case the requested
path’s destination is within the ISD I, the core path server responds by immediately sending up
to k down-segments to the local path server. In case the requested path’s destination is outside
the ISD I, then the core path server first requests the corresponding down-segments from the core
path server in destination ISD J before responding to the local path server. In both cases, the
local path server returns up to k up- and down-segments to the requesting source, and if needed,
a core-segment connecting the core of I with the core of J . Depending on the returned segments,
SCION paths can be created as follows:
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– Case 1 (immediate path segment combination, e.g., path B→ D in Figure 2a): the last AS
on the up-segment (ending at a Core AS) is the same AS as the first AS on the down-segment
(starting at a Core AS). In this case, the simple combination of up- and down-segment creates
a valid end-to-end path.
– Case 2 (AS shortcut, e.g., path B → C in Figure 2a): the up-segment and down-segment
intersect at a non-Core AS. This is the case of a shortcut where up-segment and down-segment
meet before entering the ISD Core. In this case, a shorter path is possible by removing the
extraneous part of the path. The special case when the source’s up-segment contains the des-
tination AS is treated in the same way, i.e., the intersection of both segments is omitted from
the path.
– Case 3 (peering shortcut, e.g., path A → B in Figure 2a): a peering link exists between the
two segments, so a shortcut via the peering link is possible. As in Case 2, the extraneous path
segment is cut off. The peering link could be traversing to a different ISD.
– Case 4 (core-segment combination, e.g., path A→ D in Figure 2a, or A→ I in Figure 1): the
last AS on the up-segment is different from the first AS on down-segment. This case requires
an additional core-segment to connect the up- and down-segment. In case the communication
remains within the same ISD (A → D), a local ISD core-segment is needed; otherwise (A → I),
an inter-ISD core-segment is required.
Once an end-to-end path is chosen, this path is encoded in the SCION packet header, which
makes inter-domain routing tables unnecessary for border routers: both the egress and the ingress
interface of each AS on the path are encoded as PCFS in the packet header. The destination can
respond to the source by inverting the end-to-end path from the packet header, or it can perform
its own path lookup and construction as the source did.
SCION’s beaconing process has several important aspects. The periodicity is on the order of
10 seconds – in the current system a fresh set of beacons is sent over each inter-AS link to the
neighboring ASes every 15 seconds. This beacon propagation process is thus asynchronous, i.e.,
PCBs are sent based on a local timer and are not propagated immediately upon arrival. The
paths for propagation are selected based on a path quality metric with the goal of identifying
consistent, diverse, efficient, and policy-compliant paths. Consistency refers to the requirement
that there exists at least one property along which the path is uniform, such as an AS capability
(e.g., anonymous forwarding) or link property (e.g., low latency). Diversity refers to the set of paths
that are announced over time being as path-disjoint as possible to provide high quality multi-path
options. Efficiency refers to the length, bandwidth, latency, utilization, and availability of a path,
where more efficient paths are naturally preferred. Policy compliance refers to the requirement that
the path adheres to the AS’s routing policy. Based on past PCBs that were sent, a beacon server
scores the current set of candidate path segments and sends the k best segments as the next PCB.
To provide some concreteness to this description, we currently use k = 5, and send PCBs every
15 seconds to each neighbor over each provider-to-customer link. SCION intra-ISD beaconing can
scale to networks of arbitrary size, because each inter-AS link carries the same number of PCBs
regardless of the number PCBs received by the AS.
Unlike in the current Internet, link failures are not automatically resolved by the network, but
require more active handling by end hosts. Since SCION forwarding paths are static, they break
when one of the links fails. Link failures are handled by a three-pronged approach that typically
masks link failures without any outage to the application and rapidly re-establishes fresh working
paths. More precisely, (1) PCB dissemination occurs every few seconds, constantly establishing
new working paths in case existing paths become unavailable. (2) ICMP-like control messages
rapidly erase path segments with broken links from path servers and beacon servers – thereby
triggering the dissemination of additional PCBs. Beacon servers then immediately send additional
working paths after learning of a path failure. (3) Most importantly, SCION end hosts use multi-path
communication by default, thus masking link failures to an application with another working path.
As multi-path communication is very successful in achieving high availability (even in environments
with very limited path choice [4]), SCION beacon servers actively attempt to create disjoint paths,
SCION path servers make an effort to select and announce disjoint paths, and end hosts make
an effort to compose path segments to achieve maximum resilience to path failure. Consequently,
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most path failures in SCION are imperceptible to the application, unlike the numerous short outages
plaguing the current Internet [36,33].
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Figure 3: Intra-ISD PCB propagation from the ISD Core down to customer ASes. For the sake of
illustration, the interfaces of each AS are numbered with consecutive integer values. In practice,
each AS can choose any encoding for its interfaces. In particular, only the AS itself needs to
understand its encoding.
Paths are represented at AS-level granularity, which by itself is insufficient for diversity; ASes
often have several diverse connection points, and thus a disjoint path is possible despite the AS
sequence being identical. For this reason, SCION encodes AS ingress and egress interfaces as part of
the path, exposing a finer level of path diversity. Figure 3 demonstrates this feature: AS F receives
two different beacons via two different links from the Core. Moreover F uses two different links to
send two different beacons to AS G, each containing the respective egress interfaces. AS G extends
the two beacons and forwards both of them over a single link to its customer.
An important optimization point is that SCION also supports peering links between ASes.
Consistent with AS policies in the current Internet, PCBs do not traverse peering links. However,
peering links are announced along with a regular path in a PCB. Figure 3 shows how AS1 includes
its two peering links in the PCB. If the same peering link is announced on two paths, then the
peering link can be used for the end-to-end path. SCION also supports peering links that cross
ISD boundaries, which highlights the importance of SCION’s path transparency property; a source
knows the exact set of ASes and ISDs traversed during the delivery of a packet.
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Communication within an AS is handled by existing intra-domain communication protocols,
such as IP, Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS), or Software-Defined Networking (SDN) –
border routers encapsulate the SCION packet inside an IP, MPLS, or SDN frame. Figure 2b shows
one possible intra-domain path from AS C to the ISD core.
Inter-ISD beaconing operates similarly to intra-ISD beaconing, except that inter-ISD PCBs only
traverse ISD Core ASes. The same path selection metrics apply, where an AS attempts to forward
the set of most desirable paths to its neighbors. A difference, however, is that an AS forwards
k beacons per source AS, with k = 3. The periodicity is also reduced, we forward PCBs once a
minute or upon path changes. Similar to BGP, this process is inherently not scalable, however, as
the number of ISDs and the corresponding number of Core ASes is small, this approach is viable.
Security Aspects For protection against malicious ASes and to provide a secure control plane,
SCION is equipped with an arsenal of cryptographic mechanisms. We describe an overview in this
paper; the details are in companion papers [62,40].
The root of trust of an ISD is composed of root key certificates of trusted ISD Core ASes and
Certification Authorities (CAs). The ISD’s TRC specifies which root key certificates are trusted
and how many different signatures are required for each operation. For example, an AS certificate
may require signatures from 2 different entities, an update to a new TRC may require signatures
from 4 different entities.
The SCION control plane includes the SCION Control Message Protocol (SCMP). One challenge
in the design of SCMP was how to enable efficient authentication of SCMP messages, as the na¨ıve
approach of adding a digital signature to SCMP messages could create a processing bottleneck
at routers when many SCMP messages would be created in response to a link failure. We thus
make use of an efficient symmetric key derivation mechanism called Dynamically Recreatable
Key (DRKey) [34]. In DRKey, each AS uses a local secret key known to SCION border routers to
derive on-the-fly a per-AS secret key using an efficient Pseudo-Random Function (PRF). Hardware
implementations of modern block ciphers enable faster computation than a memory lookup from
DRAM, and therefore such dynamic key derivation can even result in a speedup over fetching the
key from memory. For verification of SCMP messages, the destination AS can fetch the derived key
through an additional request message from the originating AS, which is protected by a relatively
slow asymmetric operation. However, local caching ensures that this key only needs to be fetched
infrequently, about once per hour. As a consequence, SCION provides fully secured control messages
with minimal overhead.
Similar to BGPSEC [38], each AS signs the PCB it forwards. This signature enables PCB
validation by all entities. To ensure path correctness, the forwarding information within each
Packet-Carried Forwarding State (PCFS) also needs to be cryptographically protected, however,
signature verification would hamper efficient forwarding. Thus, each AS uses a secret symmetric
key that is shared among beacon servers and border routers and is used to efficiently compute a
Message Authentication Code (MAC) over the forwarding information. The per-AS information
includes the ingress and egress interfaces, an expiration time, and the MAC computed over these
fields, which is all encoded within an 8-byte field that we refer to as Opaque Field (OF). We
use the term opaque because the structure of the field is largely at the discretion of each AS and
requires no coordination with any other AS – as long as the AS itself can extract how to forward
the packet on to the next AS.
The specified ingress and egress interfaces uniquely identify the links to the previous and fol-
lowing ASes. If a router is connected via the same outgoing interface to 3 different neighboring
ASes, 3 different egress interface identifiers would be assigned. The OF’s expiration time can be
set on the granularity of seconds or hours, depending on the type of path. For the discussion of
this overview, we only consider the common case where paths are long-lived and OFs have an
expiration time on the order of 12 hours.
In terms of cryptographic mechanisms, we built in algorithm agility, such that cryptographic
methods can be easily updated and exchanged. The MAC validation of OFs is per-AS, so an AS
can independently (without interaction with any other entity) update its keys or cryptographic
mechanisms. We support multiple signatures by an AS, thus, an AS can readily deploy a new
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signature algorithm and start adding those signatures as well. The path consistency component
of the beacon selection metric (as explained above) will automatically start creating paths where
each AS supports the new algorithm, enforcing consistency of the signature type. Validating inter-
domain PCBs is accomplished by requiring connected ISDs to cross-sign their respective TRC files
– consequently, any sequence of ISDs has a verifiable sequence of signatures, the details of which
are described in our paper on the SAINT system [40].
3.3 Data Plane: Packet Carried Forwarding State (PCFS)
While the control plane is responsible for providing end-to-end paths, the data plane ensures
packet forwarding using the provided paths. A SCION packet minimally contains a path; source and
destination addresses are optional in case the packet’s context is unambiguous without addresses.
Consequently, SCION border routers forward packets to the next AS based on the AS-level path in
the packet header (which is augmented with ingress and egress interface identifiers for each AS),
without inspecting the destination address and also without consulting a routing table. Only the
border router at the destination AS needs to inspect the destination address or packet purpose to
forward it to the appropriate local host(s).
An interesting aspect of this forwarding is enabled by the split of locator (the path towards
the destination AS) and identifier (the destination address) [18]: because in-network forwarding
does not consider the local identifier, any source or destination address format is possible. Thus,
a domain can select an arbitrary addressing format for its hosts, e.g., 4-byte IPv4, 6-byte medium
access control, 16-byte IPv6, or 20-byte accountable IP (AIP [3]) address. A nice consequence is
that an IPv4 host could directly communicate with an IPv6 destination.1
Routers can efficiently forward packets in the SCION architecture. In particular, the absence of
inter-domain routing tables and the absence of complex maximum prefix matching performed by
current routers enables construction of faster and more energy-efficient routers. During forwarding,
a border router would first verify that the packet entered through the correct ingress interface. If
the packet has not yet reached the destination AS, the egress interface defines the next hop. For
illustration purposes, let us assume that an AS uses IPv4 switching to internally forward traffic,
that the AS has fewer than 255 border interfaces (ingress- or egress-interfaces), and that each border
interface is directly connected to the neighboring AS. The AS can select internal addresses such
that all border interfaces follow a common addressing scheme, e.g., the IPv4 address is 10.1.1.X
for 0 < X < 255. The value X here uniquely identifies the preceding or following AS, and thus
can serve as the ingress or egress interface identifier in the OF. Consequently, a border router can
simply extract the egress interface identifier X from the OF, encapsulate the SCION packet into
an IPv4 packet with the destination address of 10.1.1.X, and let the intra-domain routing and
forwarding handle packet delivery to the egress interface.
3.4 Entity Validation Infrastructure
All entity authentication in SCION is based on traditional certificates, which bind identifiers to
public keys and carry digital signatures that are verified by roots of trust, i.e., public keys that are
axiomatically trusted.2 The challenge is how to achieve trust agility to enable flexible selection of
roots of trust, resilience to private key compromises, and efficient key revocation. We explore these
issues in detail in our SAINT system [40], and provide a high-level overview in this article.
A central question is how to structure the trust roots. Today’s Internet follows two trust models:
monopoly and oligarchy. In the monopoly model, a single root of trust is used for authentication.
The DNSSEC PKI [6] or the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [50] used in BGPSEC
are examples of the monopoly model as they both essentially rely on a single public key that serves
1 Communication between hosts with different network stacks requires support from the host operating
system. Today’s hosts typically assume compatible stacks on the endpoints.
2 The reason we did not make use of self-certifying public keys [42,3] for long-term identities is because of
their inherent inability for revocation and the complexities involved with key updates. For short-term
identities, however, we do appreciate their features.
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as a root of trust to verify all subsequent entities. The monopoly model suffers from two main
drawbacks: all parties must agree on a single root of trust, and the single root of trust represents
a single point of failure because its misuse enables forging a certificate for an arbitrary entity. The
oligarchy model does not fare much better – instead of a single root of trust there are several
roots of trust, all of which are equally and completely trusted. Instead of one single point of failure
in the monopoly model, the oligarchy model thus exposes several points of failure. The prime
example is the TLS PKI, featuring on the order of 1500 trusted entities including about 300 roots
of trust [17,1]. Compromise of a single trusted entity enables forging a server certificate which allows
man-in-the-middle attacks, as we have recently witnessed in several instances involving Comodo,
DigiNotar, and Turktrust.
SCION’s ISDs provide solutions to these issues by allowing each ISD to define its own set of
roots of trust, along with the policy governing their use. Such scoping of trust roots within an ISD
greatly improves security, as compromise of a private key associated with a trust root cannot be
used to forge a certificate outside the ISD.
An ISD’s trust roots and policy are encoded in the Trust Root Configuration (TRC)
file. The TRC has a version number, a list of public keys that serve as roots of trust for various
purposes, and policies governing how many signatures are required for different certificates, how
many signatures are needed to update the TRC, etc. The TRC serves as a way to bootstrap
all entity authentications. We now discuss two properties offered by the TRC: trust agility and
efficient revocation of trust roots. Trust agility offers the selection of the sets of roots of trust
to initiate validation of certificates. A user can thus select an ISD that she believes maintains an
uncompromised set of trust roots. A challenge with trust agility is to maintain global verifiability
of all entities, regardless of the user’s selection. SCION offers this property by requiring all ISDs
with a link among them to cross-sign each other’s TRC files – as long as a network path exists, a
validation path thus exists along that network path. Efficient revocation of trust roots is the
second important property. In today’s Internet, trust roots are revoked manually, or through OS or
browser updates, often requiring a week or longer until a large fraction of the Internet population
has observed such revocations. In SCION, PCBs carry the version number of the current TRC, and
the updated TRC is required to validate that PCB. An AS that realizes that it needs a newer TRC
can contact the AS from whom it has received the PCB. Following the distribution of PCBs, an
entire ISD updates the TRC within tens of seconds.
SCION also introduces new mechanisms for the validation of network entities such as: ASes,
path server and DNS responses, or web servers. We separate authentication into two different
types based on their respective emphasis on either availability or security [40]. One type is rout-
ing authentication to authenticate PCBs, which has availability as the main requirement since
control plane messages must be authenticated to provide communication paths. To achieve a higher
level of security, additional servers would need to be contacted to provide resilience to private key
compromises, but this in turn would hamper availability. In some cases, the requirement to com-
municate with additional servers introduces a circular dependency, because routing is required to
communicate with these servers, but contacting these servers is needed to verify the routing mes-
sage. Therefore, we ensure that all information required to authenticate routing messages flows
in the same direction as the routing messages themselves, avoiding circular dependencies. In the
case of SCION, AS certificates binding ASes to public keys flow from providers to customers, in the
same direction as PCBs.
The second type is service authentication, which serves the purpose of authenticating ser-
vices such as web servers or DNS replies. Since the control plane is operational when hosts com-
municate with servers, additional entities can contribute to ensure higher security to verify server
authenticity, such as integrity log servers and validators in the Attack-Resilient PKI (ARPKI)
system [8]. ARPKI is a highly secure PKI system based on log servers that keep a public log of
all certificates to monitor CAs’ operations, and CAs and validators that monitor operation of log
servers. By requiring multiple signatures on certificates, and by adding signatures on all operations
we obtain the property that at least 3 malicious trusted entities within the same ISD are needed to
perform a man-in-the-middle attack on a single domain. To further increase security, we designed
PoliCert, a system to enable domains to specify their detailed security policy [59]. By storing the
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domain policies in an ARPKI log, policy consistency and integrity is ensured. In concert, ARPKI
and PoliCert achieve a high level of security for domains’ certificates – all PKI attacks we have wit-
nessed in the past decade would have been avoided in this framework. As a last line of defense, we
propose efficient gossip protocols for verifying the consistency of log servers [14]. Clients randomly
exchange short information about the logs to guarantee that any misbehavior will eventually be
detected.
3.5 Incremental Deployment and Incentives
Support for incremental deployability plays a key role in the successful adoption of any network
architecture. To this end, we have designed SCION to be deployable (by both ISPs and end users)
without requiring substantial changes to the existing infrastructure.
Incremental Deployment. At a minimum, ISPs need only deploy a border router capable of
encapsulating and decapsulating SCION traffic as it leaves or enters their network. SCION ASes must
also deploy certificate, beacon, and path servers. These servers can run on commodity hardware and
can optionally be replicated for increased availability, e.g., Figure 2b contains two path servers and
two beacon servers. The current version of the SCION codebase uses IP as an underlying protocol,
which allows existing intra-domain networking infrastructure and configuration.
In terms of creation and deployment of ISDs, we envision these to grow organically, with one
ISD initially defined for each area with uniform legal environments. Tier-1 ISPs within those ISDs
would become Core ASes. SCION facilitates the evolution of ISD and AS structure through efficient
updates to the TRC file.
Deploying SCION to end user sites (e.g., homes or businesses) is designed to require little effort
as well, initially requiring no changes to existing software, networking stacks, nor the replace-
ment of end user network devices. For initial deployment, we achieve customer-friendly deploy-
ment through the design of a device (which we call DENA, or Device for ENhancing Availability)
that can be installed at customer locations. DENA is a bump-in-the-wire middlebox that sits be-
tween the customer’s WAN connection and their ISP. The device transparently monitors network
flows and identifies remote flow endpoints where other DENAs are present. If a remote DENA
is discovered for a given network flow, a SCION path is established as a fallback channel in case
network communication through standard BGP paths is lost or becomes unreliable. DENA is able
to switch between BGP and SCION paths transparently (providing pseudo-multi-path functionality
to network applications), improving network availability for all devices behind the middlebox, and
without requiring changes to networking stacks.
Deployment Incentives. An important issue to consider is what incentives exist for various
parties for deploying SCION. For end users, the benefits of using SCION are plentiful, ranging from
higher throughput and lower latency communication (which translates to better quality phone
calls, and higher resolution video streams), to fewer Internet outages. Users can also benefit from
the SCION extensions, enabling, for example, low-latency anonymous communication.
By deploying SCION, ISPs can provide high-availability service to their customers, and simulta-
neously increase resilience to DDoS attacks for both themselves and their customers. These service
offerings can enable new revenue streams for ISPs who have deployed SCION. There is a relatively
low cost to transitioning existing BGP business models and policies to SCION, as these policies
can be expressed and even extended. In SCION such policies are less prone to attacks, but also to
configuration errors since any error is constrained to a local domain.
Similarly to ISPs, businesses (possibly running their own ISDs) can benefit from highly available
communication at lower cost. Deploying SCION provides better connectivity for customers, and
higher resilience to DDoS. As additional benefits, path control reduces the possibility of industrial
or government espionage, while transparency further provides deterrence for such practices. Finally,
control over the businesses’ PKI can prevent man in the middle attacks.
Governments have shown interest in deploying SCION for a variety of reasons. The ability to
avoid a global root of trust, and to select their own roots, allows governments to cooperate and
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trust parties whom they deem fit. The open nature of the SCION codebase allows it to be deployed
freely onto any supported (and possibly verifiable) hardware device. This would help governments
in cases where particular hardware vendors cannot be trusted.
As of 2015, we have deployed a global SCION testbed which we are actively using to vet SCION’s
functionality and security. As of July 2015, the testbed includes deployment nodes in 5 continents
with 3 ISDs and 20 ASes. We are continually adding nodes at universities and corporate sites.
Details and requirements for sponsoring a SCION node can be found on our website.
3.6 Extensions
SCION’s extensible architecture enables new systems that can take advantage of the novel properties
and mechanisms provided. As compared to the current Internet, most of the benefits can be afforded
through the use of PCFS, path transparency, and control. We briefly describe noteworthy protocols
and systems that have been built as extensions to SCION.
Path validation – SCION, through its use of PCFS, paves way for the Origin and Path Trace
(OPT) mechanism. OPT enables the sender, receiver, and routers to cryptographically verify the
path that the packet traversed [34]. By leveraging the DRKey mechanism, routers can efficiently
derive their key, verify the path, and update the path validation fields.
Anonymity and privacy – PCFS also provides advantages for privacy. With PCFS and
path transparency, the source is able to select paths that appear more trustworthy (e.g., those
that do not traverse certain ASes). In addition, the packet header can be further obfuscated such
that ASes on the path cannot learn identifying details about the source or the destination, unless
they are immediately connected to one of them. Proposals such as LAP [28] and HORNET [13]
leverage SCION’s path selection infrastructure to offer high bandwidth and low latency anonymous
communication.
DDoS defense – the hierarchical organization of ASes into a manageable number of ISDs
enables neighbor-based contracts between pairs of ISDs, which in conjunction with path segments
inside the ISDs allows for establishing efficient bandwidth guarantees between any two end hosts.
Such bandwidth guarantees are leveraged by SIBRA [7] to prevent DDoS attacks at the archi-
tectural level: independent of the number of distributed bots, end hosts obtain protection against
Internet-wide link-flooding attacks, one of the major threats in today’s Internet.
4 Case Studies
SCION improves many aspects of the current Internet. This section highlights some of the use cases
that demonstrate unique properties offered by the new architecture.
Constraining traffic flows through trusted ASes – Path control and transparency are
important properties for sensitive traffic, where a sender wants control and assurance over which
ASes will be traversed, due to legal, secrecy, or safety considerations. For instance, banking or med-
ical data, which is typically bound to strict data privacy regulations, can be constrained in SCION
to traverse only selected authorized ASes. Furthermore, the OPT mechanism enables a sender and
receiver to verify the exact path taken on a per-packet basis, with negligible overhead [34].
Highly available communication for critical infrastructures – Critical infrastructures
such as financial networks and industrial control systems used for power distribution require a high
degree of availability. Internet outages have been known to wreak havoc on day-to-day operations,
for example preventing ATM withdrawals or payment terminal operations [10]. SCION’s control-
plane isolation through ISDs, its stable data plane, and its multi-path operation all contribute to
dramatically higher availability.
High-speed web browsing – Current congestion control hinders high-speed communication
because the sender and receiver require time to determine their sending rate and to constantly
perform congestion control. Consequently, the sending rate is usually below the maximum possible
rate. In SCION, through the SIBRA [7] extension, the sender performs a resource reservation with
its initial packet, and the receiver will likely obtain a reservation with a high sending rate that it
can immediately start to use on the reverse path. On such a reservation, no congestion control is
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needed; consequently, the web server can immediately start sending the web page at a high rate
to the browser.
Mobility support – With the proliferation of mobile devices, supporting reliable communi-
cation can be challenging since these devices frequently connect and disconnect from (sometimes
several) networks. SCION supports high availability through multi-path communication and pro-
vides a header extension to inform the other party of new down segments. In SCION, a mobile
device that obtains a new address or connection as it connects to a new network can send new
down segments to the other party. Failing paths are discarded and new paths are dynamically
discovered transparently to users and applications. One challenging case, however, is when both
sender and receiver simultaneously move to a new network and all the previously established paths
fail at the same time. In this infrequent case, a name resolution server needs to be contacted to
fetch fresh down segments for the other party [54].
5 Attacks and Defenses
SCION dramatically improves network security as compared to the current Internet, which we
illustrate based on three important classes of attacks and their defenses.
Prefix hijacking – Numerous Internet outages are due to the malicious or erroneous announce-
ment of IP address space, which is also known as prefix hijacking. Perhaps the most famous case is
the hijack of YouTube by Pakistan for internal censoring, resulting in a global outage of YouTube.
In fact, hijacks that impact only a small portion of the Internet happen on a daily basis. SCION
prevents such hijacking through several mechanisms. With ISDs, misconfigurations and attacks in
one ISD do not automatically affect others; digitally signed route announcements mean unautho-
rized injection of routes is not possible; and digitally signed path distribution allows verification of
paths by the sender.
Forged TLS certificates – Compromised roots of trust have been used to create rogue TLS
certificates. A famous case is where the government of Iran used forged certificates for Google
and Yahoo services to perform man-in-the-middle attacks on its citizens; Iran is suspected to have
mounted the attack on the DigiNotar CA, who signed these certificates. The ISDs and the ARPKI
system used in SCION prevent such attacks, as a CA’s authority is scoped to the ISDs where the CA
is active in, and using ARPKI at least 3 trusted entities all need to be compromised to perform a
successful man-in-the-middle attack. Moreover, the SCION root of trust update mechanism enables
revocation of roots of trust within tens of seconds, enabling quick recovery from compromise.
DDoS attacks – Large-scale DDoS attacks have been widely used to prevent access to domains.
For example, a large-scale attack against Estonia made several of their critical infrastructures
inaccessible during one week in April 2007 [27]. SCION would have minimized the impact of these
attacks. ISDs allow external traffic to be de-prioritized, thus enabling internal communication in
case the attack originates outside the ISD. Critical infrastructures can keep some network paths
to a destination secret, thus preventing an adversary from even sending traffic to that destination
because the cryptographic OFs are necessary to use a path. The SIBRA extension offers powerful
mechanisms for DDoS defense, as it guarantees minimal traffic rates between any pair of ASes,
which cannot be lowered even by a large-scale botnet [7], even when using new types of DDoS
attacks such as Crossfire and Coremelt [57,32].
6 Deployment Caveats
The allocation and structure of ISDs presents a challenge for the deployment of SCION. It remains
unclear, for example, which ASes within an ISDs will or should become Core ASes. We envision
that among a group of ASes who deploy a top-level ISD, the AS or ASes that can form peering
agreements with core ASes in other ISDs should become core ASes in their own ISD. However,
SCION itself does not require or impose strict rules regarding the allocation of ISDs; ISDs can
overlap, which means an AS can belong to several ISDs (cf. AS H in Figure 1). Sub-ISDs are
possible as well, offering the flexibility to start an ISD without needing to peer with core ASes
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of other ISDs and enabling finer-grained control over routing isolation and authentication. In
this context, the important properties SCION offers are path control and transparency: as long as
communicating hosts can select and inspect the path of their packets, the question of ISD partition
is of secondary nature.
Another challenge that could arise is that each AS will attempt to be its own ISD or will
want to be part of the ISD Core. While too many top-level ISDs will pose a problem for SCION
scalability, we observe that economically sound decisions will lead to larger ISDs due to economies
of scale – because the startup costs and operation of an ISD Core AS are more expensive than
a non-Core AS, the operation of a large ISD will amortize the cost over more non-Core ASes.
Moreover, ASes preferentially associate with larger ISDs, which can offer better connectivity to
other ISDs as well as to other ASes within the ISD. On the other hand, ISD growth is limited to
only as large as entities can agree on the ISD’s TRC (i.e., roots of trust). Finally, ASes desiring
to be part of the ISD Core are assessed in the same way current ASes assess peering: an AS is
permitted into the Core if the current Core ASes deem it to be large enough to fulfill Core AS
duties (e.g., participating in beacon and path server replication as illustrated in Figure 2b).
As expected in architectures with PCFS, packet headers are necessarily larger. Larger headers
place a bound on goodput, since payload space is traded off for header space. The current SCION
codebase implements the OF as an 8-byte field. Since every AS on an end-to-end path has to
be represented through a corresponding OF, the overhead increases linearly with the number of
ASes on the path. However, given that the average AS path in today’s Internet is four hops long
(and decreasing) [16,37], the overhead introduced by SCION should not exceed 40-50 bytes on
average. The performance penalty of transmitting more packets appears reasonable since per-
packet forwarding performance is faster than routing-table-based architectures. While the default
header size has not shown a performance disadvantage in our testing, many of the proposed SCION
extensions add length to the header.
Certain extensions (e.g., SIBRA, HORNET) have been designed for a use case assuming per-
vasive deployment (i.e., deployment at a majority of SCION ASes). While the benefits of these
extensions are clear, we must consider the efficiency implications of certain ASes not deploying
the extensions. For example, data payload space may be lost due to additional signatures or key
material for path validation on nodes that do not validate paths, leading to inefficiency in data
transfer. We have designed our extensions to be compatible with non-deploying nodes, but future
work should consider improvements such as opportunistic enabling of these extensions.
Due to path dissemination and registration dynamics, SCION beacon and path servers can
incur a high overhead under specific circumstances. For example, if a given link’s state fluctuates
frequently between available and unavailable (due to error, hardware fault, or an adversary), the
beacon server would need to consistently update the set of paths that include that link, and serve
new paths excluding that link. We expect that this case will be rare, but also easily detectable.
Additionally, higher quality (uptime, availability) links will have higher probability of selection,
minimizing the impact of rapid path fluctuations.
We have shown that the basic building blocks of SCION are relatively straightforward to un-
derstand and have many beneficial properties and applications. However, as more extensions and
alternative PKIs are added to the architecture, the operational complexity of the architecture in-
creases correspondingly. We believe that this additional complexity is worth the security, efficiency,
and availability guarantees provided by the extensions. It is ultimately up to the networking and
research community to decide which of these extensions will be deemed worthwhile for widescale
deployment.
7 Related Work
Several efforts on redesigning the Internet have been made over the past two decades to satisfy
the new requirements of emerging Internet-based applications. Such requirements include naming,
routing, mobility, network efficiency, availability, and evolvability of the Internet. We discuss several
projects in this space based on a loosely temporal order clustered by topics.
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The idea of clustering the network into domains has been attempted since the early days of the
Internet. The Nimrod routing architecture [11], to our knowledge, is the first published description
of these concepts. Nimrod describes a hierarchy of clusters of hosts, routers, or networks. A secure
version of Nimrod was later proposed [55]. FARA [15] proposes a general notion of an entity to
include clusters of computers that can be reached as a communication endpoint.
The NewArch project [15] describes comprehensive requirements for a new Internet, such as
separation of identity from location, late binding using association, identity authenticity, and evolv-
ability. However, it mostly emphasizes a new direction for end-point entities while the packet deliv-
ery in the current IP network is left intact. NewArch uses the New Internet Routing Architecture
(NIRA) [61] for inter-domain routing, which aims to introduce competition among ISPs in the core
by providing route control to the end users who can choose domain-level paths.
NDN [30,43] decouples location from identity and uses identity for locating the correspond-
ing content. NDN relies heavily on in-network caching of data and is useful for accessing popular
static content. However, NDN’s scalability would suffer in the face of an increasing number of new,
ephemeral content (e.g., voice or video calls), and require even more complex and energy-consuming
routers than IP routers. The Publish-Subscribe Internet Routing Paradigm (PSIRP) project sup-
ports information-centric networking based on a publish-subscribe approach [47]. They propose an
elegant approach to reduce the state on routers by having packets carry Bloom filters to encode
the next hops of a multicast packet [31]. The CCNx project provides a specific implementation of
content-centric networking, developing detailed specifications and prototype systems [12].
Mobility-first [48] is an architecture that quickly maps billions of identities to their locations,
yet does not propose a fundamental change in the underlying forwarding architecture in terms of
security and availability. Nebula [5] addresses security problems in the current Internet. Nebula
takes a so-called default-off approach to reach a specific service, where a sender can send packets
only if an approved path to a service is available. The network architecture helps the service to verify
whether the packet followed the approved path (i.e., supporting path verification). However, Nebula
achieves this property at a high cost. All routers on the path need to perform computationally-
expensive path verification for every single packet and need to keep per-flow state, limiting its
usage to highly specialized services.
Serval [44] proposes name-based service discovery and routing, and introduces a new service-
access layer that enables late binding of a service to its location. Late binding provides flexibility in
migrating and distributing services, yet it attempts to optimize networking for special application-
services (especially in data-center network) built on top of the current Internet.
XIA [26] proposes an evolvable network architecture that can easily adapt to the evolution of
networks by supporting various principal types (where the principal includes but is not limited
to service, content, host, domains, and path). Due to its flexibility, yet lack of specific data-plane
mechanism, XIA uses SCION for secure and available data forwarding.
All the aforementioned new Internet architectures attempt to solve issues facing applications
built on top of the current Internet, yet do not address the very fundamental architectural problems
that hamper available and private data communication in the presence of malicious parties. The
Framework for Internet Innovation (FII) [35] also proposes a new architecture to enable evolution,
diversity, and continuous innovation, such that the Internet can be composed of a heterogeneous
conglomerate of architectures. The ChoiceNet [60] architecture proposes an “economy plane” to
enable network providers to offer new network-based services to customers, providing an network
environment for improving innovation and competition.
Several architecture proposals suggest the approach of better path control for senders and
receivers, for example Segment Routing [20], Pathlets [25], NIRA [61], i3 [56], or SNAPP [46].
Forward [23] and SysSec [58] are proposing to build secure and trusted Information and Com-
munication Technology (ICT) systems by engaging academia and industry. Forward is an initiative
by the European Commission to promote the collaboration and partnership between industry and
academia in their common goal of protecting ICT infrastructures. The Forward project catego-
rizes security threats to various ICT systems including individual devices, social networks, critical
infrastructures (such as smart electric grids), and the Internet infrastructure, and it aims at co-
ordinating multiple research efforts to build secure and trusted ICT systems and infrastructures.
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SysSec aims to consolidate the systems security research community in Europe, promoting cy-
bersecurity education, engaging a think-tank in discovering the threats and vulnerabilities of the
current and future Internet, creating an active research road map in the area, and developing a
joint working plan to conduct state-of-the-art collaborative research. Since Forward and SysSec
currently focus on identifying and handling threats, we believe our proposed tasks to be a good
addition to the projects by providing an architecture that would significantly reduce the attack
surface. RINA [49] is a recursive inter-network architecture that provides unified APIs across all
protocol layers. In RINA, all layers have the same functions with different scope and range, where
a layer is a distributed application that performs and manages inter-process communication. We
would make an effort to design our prototype to fit into this paradigm so that our architecture can
support seamless integration with other higher-layer security protocols/mechanisms.
Many researchers are currently studying Software-Defined Networking (SDN), for example in
the OpenFlow [41,45] project. These efforts mainly consider intra-domain communication, which
SCION can leverage to communicate within a domain.
Several future Internet efforts provide testbeds for running and testing a new architecture, such
as GENI [24], Fi-ware [22] and FIRE [21].
We have developed SCION with a focus on security and high availability for point-to-point com-
munication, which is a unique perspective and can contribute to other future Internet efforts. For
instance, even content-centric networking needs a routing mechanism to reach the data source.
SCION can offer the routing protocol to support that functionality. Once a server is found in a
service-based infrastructure or a nearby content cache is found in a content-centric architecture,
point-to-point communication between the end host and the server will offer the highest com-
munication efficiency, as pure forwarding is faster than server-based or content-based lookups.
Similarly, SCION can provide the point-to-point communication fabric in a mobility-centric archi-
tecture. Consequently, SCION offers mechanisms that complement many previously proposed future
Internet architectures.
8 Conclusions
We have presented SCION, a future Internet architecture that provides security, availability, trans-
parency, and scalability. We have demonstrated that SCION offers numerous advantages over com-
peting architectures, but can also work jointly with other proposals as an underlying building block
for highly reliable point-to-point communication.
Despite its research maturity after 5 years of work, SCION is still in its infancy in terms of
deployment. While requiring relatively small changes by ISPs and domains, broadening adoption is
currently SCION’s greatest challenge. We expect that the potential benefits for various stakeholders
will provide strong incentives to drive adoption, leading to islands of SCION deployment. In the
long term, connections and mergers among islands will enable ever-increasing numbers of native
SCION end-to-end connections.
Working on SCION has offered us the opportunity to think about Internet architectures from
a clean-slate perspective. The absence of limiting constraints (imposed by the current Internet
environment) has been particularly rewarding, as the deep exploration of a problem space enabled
us to design a system with properties that were previously thought to be impossible. We anticipate
that the insight into the possible applications of a secure, dynamic, and highly-available network
will help engage the network community to leverage SCION for their applications, and contribute
to the project.
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